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Iran's New Security Chief Threatens US Interests as Sanctions Squeeze Tightens

Elena MarquezPublished 4d ago7 min readBased on 13 sources
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Iran's New Security Chief Threatens US Interests as Sanctions Squeeze Tightens
Photo by khamenei.ir / CC BY 4.0

Iran's newly appointed Supreme National Security Council chief, Mohsen Rezai, warned neighboring states against joining Washington's latest sanctions campaign and threatened to target US commercial interests across the region, in his most extensive public statement since taking office.

Speaking on state broadcaster IRIB on Saturday, August 23, Rezaei said Iran would strike oil-shipping routes out of the Gulf — including alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz — if neighboring countries joined what he called the US "economic war" against Tehran. He also said that if the US imposed economic sanctions, Iran would target US oil and economic companies operating in and around Iran and elsewhere. Rezaei claimed Iran had not yet attacked any American economic interests, saying it had so far only targeted military bases (The Guardian).

Rezaei was named this month in a series of senior appointments widely seen as hardening Tehran's political and military posture. He served as commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — Iran's elite military force separate from the regular army — for most of the 1980–88 war with Iraq, a credential that lends weight to his threats of military escalation. His elevation to the security council, Iran's highest body for defense and national security decision-making, signals a deliberate shift toward figures with deep IRGC pedigrees at a moment of acute confrontation with Washington.

The threats come amid a rapidly escalating economic confrontation. On August 20, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the United States would impose "the toughest sanctions in history" on Iran (Reuters). Sanctions are government-imposed restrictions that cut a country off from international trade and finance — designed to pressure a government by crippling its economy. The following day, President Trump unveiled a new campaign to isolate Iran's economy, threatening "tremendous economic consequences" on any country that helps or does business with Tehran. Washington has also called on other governments — notably China, among Iran's top strategic partners — to join the isolation effort. Beijing rejected the initiative, arguing that US sanctions would not resolve the Middle East conflict.

The UAE moved first among Gulf states to comply. On Tuesday of the prior week, Abu Dhabi announced it was suspending all trade and financial transactions with Tehran until further notice — a decision that directly contextualizes Rezaei's warning to neighbors. The US Treasury has been conducting what it calls Operation Economic Fury, a targeted sanctions campaign aimed at cutting off Iran's funding streams.

The backdrop is a conflict now approaching its sixth month. The war between the US (alongside Israel) and Iran began on February 28 and has dragged on without significant resolution. A ceasefire agreement signed in June collapsed, leaving Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow waterway at the mouth of the Gulf through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supplies passed before the conflict began. A US naval blockade has since sought to block Iranian ports from exporting oil vital to the country's economy.

Trump has escalated the rhetoric around the waterway considerably. On Monday, he told reporters he liked the idea of declaring the Strait of Hormuz a US territory, saying, "We control it with the blockade." On Friday, he told a crowd in South Carolina: "We don't even know if we won, because I view the strait of Hormuz as an American territory right now." On Saturday night, Trump shared a map graphic on his social media platform showing the Gulf and labeling the Strait of Hormuz as a "new US territory" (The Guardian).

Rezaei countered that discussions were ongoing with Oman — the strait's southern neighbor — over management of the waterway, and said fees would be imposed. The implication is that Iran intends to treat the strait as a revenue-generating asset under its sovereign authority, directly contesting Trump's territorial claims.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for his part, has struck a different tone. On August 22, he called for an end to the months-long war with the United States, stating that Tehran holds a position of strength (Al Jazeera). Yet on August 23, Pezeshkian described Iran as being in "a full-scale economic, military and security war" as US sanctions deepen (CNN; Reuters). He acknowledged the country's economic difficulties while insisting that foreign pressure — including efforts to persuade Muslim governments not to conduct economic transactions with Iran — had failed to break national unity (IRNA).

Pezeshkian has previously argued that old methods cannot solve Iran's current challenges, citing sanctions and the enemy's efforts to create an economic blockade (IRNA). He has also told the French president that US behavior had "diverted the path of diplomacy toward threats, pressure and sanctions" (President.ir), and has emphasized regional diplomacy as a means to reduce the effects of the siege (President.ir).

The broader context here is the interplay between Rezaei's hardline posturing and Pezeshkian's simultaneous call for de-escalation. Both men are operating within the same systemic constraints: a collapsed ceasefire, a strait under Iranian control but under US blockade, an economy being squeezed by what Treasury calls the toughest sanctions ever contemplated, and a growing list of states — beginning with the UAE — severing commercial ties. Rezaei's threats to expand targeting from US military installations to US commercial and energy interests amount to a qualitative shift in Iran's declared posture. His specific mention of alternative oil-shipping routes beyond the Strait of Hormuz suggests Iran is mapping escalation options that would extend disruption beyond the chokepoint it already controls.

For Gulf states, the calculation is now acute. The UAE has already aligned with Washington. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain face the same US pressure to sever ties and the same Iranian threat of retaliation against shipping lanes. China's refusal to endorse the sanctions campaign complicates the coalition Trump is trying to build, but Beijing's opposition has not translated into material support for Tehran's economy. Oman's role as interlocutor on strait management discussions may offer a narrow diplomatic channel, though Rezaei's framing of imposed fees suggests a coercive rather than cooperative approach.

The six-month mark of the conflict is approaching with no political process in place. The June ceasefire is in ruins. Two parallel tracks are now visible: a US track centered on maximum economic pressure and de facto territorial claims over the strait, and an Iranian track split between Pezeshkian's diplomatic overtures and Rezaei's explicit threats of military and economic retaliation. Neither track has produced a viable off-ramp, and the gap between them is widening.